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The Recreation Use of Land and Water Act
Lory v. City of Philadelphia
Debra Wolf Goldstein*
I. INTRODUCTION
As a result of the recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision
in Lory v. City of Philadelphia,' local governments and state
agencies in Pennsylvania have greatly expanded immunity from
lawsuits brought by people injured on government owned recrea-
tional lands. The Lory court determined that Pennsylvania's
Recreation Use of Land and Water Act (the "Recreation Act"),2
read together with the state's Political Subdivision Tort Claims
Act (the "Tort Claims Act"),' immunizes municipal governments
from liability for injuries resulting from both negligent mainte-
nance of their recreational lands and their willful failure to
guard or warn of hazards on that property.4 Under the provi-
* Member of the Pennsylvania Bar; J.D., cum laude, 1988, Georgetown Univer-
sity Law Center; B.A. 1983, Brown University. The author is grateful to Jay R. Gold-
stein, Esq., and William W. Shakely, Chief Counsel, Pennsylvania Department of
Conservation and Natural Resources, for their critiques of an earlier draft of this note.
The author is Regional Advisor to the Bureau of Recreation and Conservation,
Pennsylvania Department of Conservation and Natural Resources. The views expressed
here are entirely those of Ms. Goldstein and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
1. 674 A.2d 673 (Pa. 1996).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §§ 477-1-477-8 (West 1994).
3. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8541-8564 (1982 & Supp. 1996).
4. Lory, 672 A.2d at 676.
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sions of the Sovereign Immunity Act,5 the Lory holding applies
equally to state owned recreational lands.' Consequently, once
an individual's injury is determined to have occurred on land cov-
ered by the Recreation Act, political subdivisions and Common-
wealth agencies can claim an absolute defense to liability.
As outlined in the Lory case, the Recreation Act and Tort
Claims Act work together.7 The Recreation Act shields private
and public landowners from negligence liability for injuries suf-
fered by people using their land for recreational purposes with-
out a fee.8 The landowner remains liable to recreational users
only. for "wilful or malicious failure to guard or warn" against a
dangerous condition. 9 The Tort Claims Act, on the other hand,
confers tort immunity upon political subdivisions for acts that
constitute "willful misconduct."10 In Lory, the supreme court
concluded that the "willful" standard imposing liability under
the Recreation Act is the same standard rendering a political
subdivision immune from injury liability under the Tort Claims
Act.1 Government agencies thus have a blanket defense to liabil-
ity for injuries occurring on their recreational lands.
Section I of this note outlines the operation and interpretation
of Pennsylvania's Recreation Act. Section II summarizes the
immunity provisions of the Tort Claims and Sovereign Immunity
Acts. Section III analyzes the Lory case, and Section IV looks at
legislative responses to the decision. Lastly, this note points out
that in the aftermath of the Lory decision, questions as to what
constitutes recreational land under the Recreation Act and
whether governments should be eligible for Recreation Act
immunity are being reconsidered.
5. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8521-8528 (1982 & Supp. 1996).
6. See infra note 97 discussing identical effect of Recreation Act immunity on Tort
Claims and Sovereign Immunity Acts.
In Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 305 A.2d 877 (Pa. 1973), the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court abrogated the judicially created doctrine of governmental (i.e.,
municipal) immunity. Ayala, 305 A.2d at 889. Five years later, in Mayle v. Pennsylvania
Dept. of Highways, 388 A.2d 709 (Pa. 1978), the supreme court abolished sovereign immu-
nity, previously held to be constitutionally grounded. Mayle, 388 A.2d at 386. The state
legislature responded to these two cases by creating statutory immunities for local and
state agencies: the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act of 1978, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 8541-8564 (1982 & Supp. 1996), and the Sovereign Immunity Act of 1980,42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 8521-8528 (1982 & Supp. 1996).
7. Lory, 674 A.2d at 675.
8. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §§ 477-1-477-8 (West 1994).
9. Id.
10. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8541, 8542(a) (1982 & Supp. 1996). The Recreation
Act uses the spelling "wilful," whereas the Tort Claims Act uses the spelling "willful."
Either spelling is correct. See NEW WEBsRaa'S DIcTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(5th ed. 1981).
11. Lory, 674 A.2d at 676.
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II. THE RECREATION USE OF LAND AND WATER ACT
America's growing population coupled with citizens' increased
leisure time and interest in healthy outdoor activities have
resulted in greater demand for recreational land. 12 Government
programs to acquire land for public parks and trails are limited,
however, both by funding constraints 3 and the public's uneasi-
ness about aggressive government land acquisition policies.' 4
Communities have thus turned to a variety of other means for
making open space lands available to the public,15 including
12. See, e.g., More people, the same land, HARRISBURG PATRIOT NEWS, May 12, 1996
at B10; Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, Pennsylvania Greenway
Partnership, vol. 2, no. 23 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION UPDATE 8-9 (June 7,1996) (survey
shows 79% of Pennsylvanians consider outdoor recreation activities an important part of
their lifestyles); PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES, PENN.
SYLVANIA'S RECREATION PLAN 1991-1997 at 247 (survey respondents expect their leisure
and recreation time to increase over next five years); J. Barrett, Good Sports and Bad
Lands: The Application of Washington's Recreation Use Statute Limiting Landowner Lia-
bility, 53 WASH. L. REV. 1, 4 (1977) (noting: "There is little doubt that overpopulation and
increased leisure time have added to the pressures on publicly owned recreation areas in
the past two decades.").
13. See, e.g., PENNSYLVANIA DEPT. OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES, supra note 12
at 270 (funding public recreation by increasing taxes is least popular financing method);
Don Hopey, Congress Mining Public Land Fund, PITrSBURGH POsT-GAZErrE, June 17,
1996 at A6 (Congress voting to appropriate from the federal Land & Water Conservation
Fund the smallest amount in twenty-two years to acquire open space lands).
Governments are being forced to become more creative about financing the recre-
ational properties they currently own. See, e.g., Linda Kanamine, Squeezing Extra Green
From Public Spaces, USA TODAY, June 11, 1996, at Section Life p.2 (noting that cash-
strapped park departments favor pay-to-play activities over free parks and ballfields);
Linda Kanamine, National Parks May Court Sponsors, USA TODAY, June 11, 1996, Life
at p.7d (noting that National Park Service is considering licensing national parks logos to
private industry).
14. See, e.g., Michael Matza, Hiking Club's 7Iuts' Draw Fire, THE PHILADELPHIA
INQUIRER, July 1, 1996, at A3 (reporting that a property rights group labels Appalachian
Mountain Club "a radical environmental group with an anti-people agenda" because it
advocates federal acquisition of twenty-six million acres of forest land in Northeast).
15. See, e.g., LAND TRUST EXCHANGE & THE TRUST FOR PUBLIC LAND, THE CONSER-
VATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK 2 (1988)(explaining how to use conservation easements, a
technique halfway between acquisition and government land use regulation); LORING
LAB. SCHWARZ, GREENWAYS: A GUIDE TO PLANNING, DESIGN, AND DEVELOPMENT § 6 (1993)
(describing techniques for developing greenways); RAILS-To-TRAns CONSERVANCY, TRAILS
FOR THE TWENTY-FIRsT CENTURY (Karen-Lee Ryan ed. 1995)(detailing how to develop
multi-use trail corridors); NEW JERSEY DEPT. OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, OPEN
LANDS MANAGEMENT PRoGRAM FACT SHEET (describing currently unfunded state program
that reimburses private landowners for costs incurred in opening their lands for public
recreational uses, including the expenses of fencing, trash receptacles and liability insur-
ance); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 6841 (1995) (limiting liability of civic organizations and
their sponsors for negligent acts or omissions occurring in connection with the construc-
tion or maintenance of parkland); TENN. CODE ANN. § 11-10-105 (1992Xproviding that
owners of land subject to conservation easement owe no duty of care to keep that land
safe for entry).
Creative techniques for making recreational land available are particularly
important in areas of the country with few large public landholdings. See President's
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adopting state recreational use laws that limit the tort liability of
landowners who make their lands available to the public for rec-
reational uses free of charge. 16 Many states, including Penn-
sylvania, have modeled their recreational use acts on the Model
Act promulgated by the Council of State Governments.'
7
A. The Recreation Act: The Duty Of Care
Pennsylvania's General Assembly recognized the need for
additional recreational areas and knew there were large private
landholdings in the Commonwealth that could fill this need.1
8
The legislature realized, however, that it was not reasonable to
expect landowners to open themselves up to liability for injuries
suffered by recreational users of their land when they received no
Commission on Americans Outdoors, Recreation on Private Lands (March 1986) (noting
that private lands constitute 60% of the 1.35 billion acres of America's forests and range-
lands; most public lands are in less populated areas of the country, unlike private lands
that are often located near population centers).
16. Some examples of "hold harmless" recreational use statutes are the following,
which exist in forty-eight states in addition to Pennsylvania: ALA. CODE §§ 35-15-1 to 35-
15-5, 35-15-20 to 35-15-28 (1991); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-1551 (1990); ARK. STAT.
ANN. §§ 18-11-301 to 18-11-307 (1987); CAL Crv. CODE § 846 (West 1982); CALIF. GOVT.
CODE § 51238.5 (1983); COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 33-41-101 to 33-41-106 (1995), §§ 29-7.5-101
to 29-7.5-106; (1986); CONN GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-557f to 52-557j (West 1991); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 7, §§ 5901-5907(1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 375.251 (West 1974 & Supp. 1987); GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 51-3-20 to 51-3-26, 12-3-116 (1990); HAwAn REv. STAT. §§ 520-1 to 520-8
(1985); IDAHO CODE §§ 36-1601 to 36-1604 (1994); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 745, §§ 65/1 to 65/7
(Smith-Hurd 1993); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 14-2-6-3 (West 1983); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 461C.1
to 461C.7 (1984 & Supp. 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-3201 to 58-3207 (1983); Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. §§ 150.645, 411.190 (Baldwin 1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:2791, 9:2795
(West 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 159-A (Supp. 1995); MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN.
§§ 5-1101 to 5-1108 (1989); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch.21, § 17C (West 1994); MCH. COMP.
LAws ANN. § 324.73110 (West 1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 604A.20 to 604A.26 (West
1996); Mss. CODE ANN. §§ 89-2-1 to 89-2-7, 89-2-21 to 89-2-27 (1992); Mo. STAT. ANN.
§§ 537.345 to 537.349 (Vernon 1988 & Supp. 1996); MONT. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 70-16-301
to 70-16-302, 23-2-321 (1993); NEB. ReV. STAT. §§ 37-1001 to 37-1008 (1995); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 41.510 (Michie 1986); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 212.34 (1989), § 508.14 (1983
& Supp. 1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:42A-1 to 2A:42A-7 (West Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 16-3-9 (Michie 1987), 17-4-7 (Michie 1995); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 9-103 (McKin-
ney 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-95 (1994); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 53-08-01 to 53-08-06
(Michie 1989 & Supp. 1995); Omo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1533.18 to 1533.181 (Page 1995 &
Supp. 1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 76, §§ 10 to 15 (West 1995); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 105.655
to 105.680 (1993); R.I. GENERAL LAw §§ 32-6-1 to 32-6-7 (Michie 1994); S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 27-3-10 to 27-3-70 (Law. Co-op. 1991); S.D. Comp. LAws ANN. §§ 20-9-12 to 20-9-18
(1996); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 11-10-101 to 11-10-104 (1992), 70-7-101 to 70-7-105 (1995);
TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE §§ 75.001 to 75.004 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1996); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 57-14-1 to 57-14-7 (1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 5212 (1993); VA. CODE
ANN. § 29.1-509 (Michie. 1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4.24.200, 4.24.210 (1988 &
Supp. 1996); W. VA. CODE §§ 19-25-1 to 19-25-7 (1993 & Supp. 1996); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 895.52 (West 1995); Wyo. STAT. §§ 34-19-101 to 34-19-106 (1990).
17. See Council of State Governments, Public Recreation on Private Lands: Limi-
tations on Liability, 24 SUGGESTED STATE LEGIS. 150, 150-52 (1965) (the "Model Act").
18. See Rivera v. Philadelphia Theological Seminary, 507 A.2d 1, 7-8 (Pa. 1986).
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compensation in return.19 Consequently, Pennsylvania's Recrea-
tion Act, adopted in 1966, was designed expressly "to encourage
owners of land to make land and water areas available to the
public for recreational purposes by limiting their liability toward
persons entering thereon for such purposes." ° The Recreation
Act limits the traditional duty of care that landowners owe to
entrants upon their land21 as follows:
Section 477-3. Duty to keep premises safe; warning
Except as specifically recognized or provided in section 6 of this act,
an owner of land owes no duty of care to keep the premises safe for
entry or use by others for recreational purposes, or to give any warn-
ing of a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity on such prem-
ises to persons entering for such purposes.
22
Section 6 of the Recreation Act reads, in pertinent part:
Section 477-6. Liability not limited
Nothing in this act limits in any way any liability which otherwise
exists:
(1) For wilful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a danger-
ous condition, use, structure, or activity.
23
Pennsylvania courts have held that the willfulness standard
outlined in section 6 of the Recreation Act is the same duty of
19. Rivera, '507 A.2d at 7-8.
20. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 477-1 (West 1994).
21. See generally 62 Am. Jur. 2d, Premises Liability §§ 72-479 (1990 & Supp.
1996).
22. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 477-3 (West 1994). Furthermore, section 4 of the Rec-
reation Act provides:
Section. 477-4. Assurance of safe premises; duty of care; responsibility, liability
Except as specifically recognized by or provided in section 6 of this act, an owner of
land who either directly or indirectly invites or permits without charge any person
to use such property for recreational purposes does not thereby:
(1) Extend any assurance that the premises are safe for any purpose.
(2) Confer upon such person the legal status of an invitee or licensee to whom a
duty of care is owed.
(3) Assume responsibility for or incur liability for any injury to persons or property
caused by an act of omission of such persons.
Id. § 477-4.
23. Id. § 477-6 (emphasis added). See generally Betty Van der Smissen, American
Motorcyclist Assoc., Recreational User Statutes: A Review of Landowner Hold-Harmless
Laws in the United States, 27-28 & Table 1, col. 6 (1987) (summarizing exceptions to
immunity contained in states' recreational use acts).
Some state courts have found the immunity provided by their recreational use
statutes broad enough to protect landowners from the attractive nuisance doctrine,
whereas other jurisdictions have not. Compare Blair v. United States, 433 F. Supp. 217
(D.C. Nev. 1977) (holding Nevada recreational statute negated attractive nuisance doc-
trine) with Smith v. Crown-Zellerbach, Inc., 638 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1981) (finding attrac-
tive nuisance doctrine not negated by Louisiana recreational use statute). Pennsylvania
courts have not directly addressed the tension between the duty of care owed under the
Recreation Act and the doctrine of attractive nuisance.
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care owed to gratuitous licensees at common law.24 According to
this standard, a possessor of land is liable for physical harm
caused to gratuitous licensees under the standard of care set
forth in Section 342 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,2 which
provides:
Section 342. Dangerous Condition Known to Possessor
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to
licensees by a condition on the land if, but only if,
(a) the possessor knows or has reason to know of the condition and
should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such
licensees, and should expect that they will not discover or realize the
danger, and
(b) he fails to exercise reasonable care to make the condition safe,
or warn the licensees of the condition and the risk involved, and
(c) the licensees do not know or have reason to know of the condi-
tion and the risk involved.26
Federal courts have analyzed the willfulness standard some-
what differently, concluding that willfulness under section 6 of
Pennsylvania's Recreation Act contains two elements: (1) actual
knowledge of a danger; (2) that is not obvious to those entering
the premises.
27
B. Public v. Private Landowners
The Model Act makes clear in its preamble that it is designed
to "encourage [the] availability of private lands by limiting the
liability of landowners."' The actual language of the model leg-
islation, however, does not differentiate between private and
public landowners.
29
While some states have followed the lead of the Model Act and
limited the application of recreational use statutes to private
landowners,3 0 other states have legislatively 1 or judicially32
extended their recreational use statutes to cover public landown-
24. Baran v. Pagnotti, 586 A.2d 978, 980-81 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (finding that a
gratuitous licensee is a person who is expressly or impliedly permitted to enter upon
another person's land for the licensee's benefit).
25. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTs § 342 (1965).
26. Baron, 586 A.2d at 981 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 342 (1965)).
27. See Livingston v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 609 F. Supp. 643, 649 (E.D.
Pa. 1985), affd mem., 782 F.2d 1029 (3d Cir. 1986)(quoting Kopp v. R.S. Noonan, Inc., 123
A.2d. 429,43 (Pa. 1956)). See also Flohr v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 821 F. Supp.
301 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Capriotti v. Bunnell, 685 F.Supp. 462 (M.D. Pa. 1988); Rosa v.
United States, 613 F. Supp. 469 (M.D. Pa. 1985); Davidow v. United States, 583 F. Supp.
1170 (W.D. Pa. 1984).
28. See Model Act, supra note 17 at 150 (emphasis added).
29. See id.
30. See, e.g., HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 520-1 to 520-8 (1985); Chapman v. Pinellas
County, 423 So.2d 578, 580 (Fla. App. 1982) (noting that in light of abolition of sovereign
immunity, counties are not entitled to protection of recreation act).
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ers.3 -These latter jurisdictions tend to reason that because state
and governmental immunity statutes provide public entities
with any defenses available to private persons, if a private land-
owner is shielded from negligence liability under a recreation
act, then state and local agencies should also be immune. 4
Pennsylvania's Recreation Act does not specify whether its
scope is limited to private property owners."5 Prior to 1986,
Pennsylvania courts ruled that the Commonwealth should not be
considered an "owner of land" under the Recreation Act. 6 These
cases reasoned that government entities did not need statutory
encouragement to open their lands to the public because their
recreational lands were by definition available for public use.3
7
In 1986, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth
v. Auresto3M ruled that Recreation Act immunity should be avail-
able to the Commonwealth.3 9 The court reasoned that since the
passage of the Sovereign Immunity Act, with its narrow excep-
tions to blanket immunity, "the Commonwealth's exposure to lia-
bility occurs only in instances where a private party would also
be subject to liability."' Since Auresto, Pennsylvania courts
have held that the Recreation Act applies to local governments as
well.41
31. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 35-15-21(1) (1991) (finding that owner includes "(a)ny
public or private organization... any federal, State, or local political subdivision or any
agency"); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 745, § 65/2(b) (West 1973) (holding that " 'Owner' includes
the possessor of any interest in land, whether it be a tenant, lessee, occupant, the State of
Illinois and its political subdivisions, or person in control of the premises.").
32. See, e.g., Sega v. State, 456 N.E.2d 1174 (N.Y. 1983).
33. See generally Van der Smissen, supra note 23, at 11-12 & Table 1, col. 4.
34. See Trimblett v. New Jersey, 383 A.2d 1146 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1977). See also
Sandra M. Renwood, Note, Beyond "Commonwealth v. Auresto: Which Property is Pro-
tected by the Recreation Use of Land & Water Act? 49 U. Prrr. L. REv. 261 (1987) (discuss-
ing applicability of recreational use statutes to public and private landowners).
35. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §§ 477-1 to 477-8 (West 1994). At the time the Rec-
reation Act was passed in 1966, neither the Commonwealth nor its political subdivisions
were subject to suit. See Brown, 305 A.2d at 868-70; Ayala, 305 A.2d at 877-78. Thus
there would have been no need to expressly extend Recreation Act immunity to public
entities.
36. Borgen v. Fort Pitt Museum Assoc., 477 A.2d 36 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984);
Ehehalt v. Nyari O'Dette, Inc., 481 A.2d 365 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984).
37. See Borgen, 477 A.2d at 39; Ehehalt, 481 A.2d at 367.
38. 511 A.2d 815 (Pa. 1986).
39. Auresto, 511 A.2d at 817.
40. Id.
41. Walsh v. City of Philadelphia, 585 A.2d 445 (Pa. 1991); Jones v. Cheltenham
Twp., 543 A.2d 1258 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988); Farley v. Twp. of Upper Darby, 514 A.2d
1023 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986), allocatur denied, 536 A.2d 1334 (Pa. 1987). As discussed in
Section IV of this note, the state legislature is considering making governments once
again ineligible for Recreation Act immunity.
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C. "Land" Under The Recreation Act
Aside from the issue of who is an eligible property owner under
the Recreation Act, much litigation has centered on whether an
injury suffered occurred on "land" within the meaning of the
Act.4" The Recreation Act makes no distinction between
improved and unimproved land, large and small parcels, or rural
and urban recreational areas.43 Rather, the Act seems to cloak
landowners with immunity from negligence claims as long as
property is entered upon for "recreational purposes" free of
charge. Although the recreational activities listed in the Act
tend to be those enjoyed in a more rural setting, the list is
expressly noninclusive and includes activities that can be per-
formed in urbanized settings such as fishing and swimming.
44
Moreover, the Recreation Act's definition of "land" expressly
includes improvements to realty such as buildings and other
structures.45
In the last decade, however, Pennsylvania courts have inter-
preted the Recreation Act to exclude developed recreational
areas. 46 The first appellate court case to consider the issue,
Rivera v. Philadelphia Theological Seminary, 7 analyzed
whether an indoor swimming pool constituted "land" entitled to
immunity under the Recreation Act.48 By a four to three vote,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the Recreation Act
was not intended to apply to "enclosed recreational facilities in
urban regions."49 The court noted that with the exception of
swimming, all of the other activities listed as "recreational pur-
42. The Recreation Act provides:
Section. 477-2. Definitions
As used in this act:
(1) "Land" means land, roads, water, watercourses, private ways and buildings,
structures and machinery or equipment when attached to the realty.
(2) "Owner" means the possessor of a fee interest, a tenant, lessee, occupant or
person in control of the premises.
(3) "Recreational purpose" includes, but is not limited to, any of the following, or
any combination thereof: hunting, fishing, swimming, boating, camping, picnick-
ing, hiking, pleasure driving, nature study, water skiing, water sports and viewing
or enjoying historical, archaeological, scenic, or scientific sites.
(4) "Charge" means the admission price or fee asked in return for invitation or
permission to enter or go upon the land.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 477-2 (West 1994).
43. Id. §§ 477-1 to 477-8.
44. Id. § 477-2(3).
45. Id. § 477-2(1).
46. See Mills v. Commonwealth, 633 A.2d 1115 (Pa. 1991); Walsh v. City of Phila-
delphia, 585 A.2d 445 (Pa. 1991); Rivera v. Philadelphia Theological Seminary, 507 A.2d
1 (Pa. 1986).
47. 507 A.2d 1 (Pa. 1986).
48. Rivera, 507 A.2d at 9.
49. Id.
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poses" in the Act are pursued outdoors 0 This reading, of course,
ignores the phrase "including but not limited to" in the Recrea-
tion Act's definition of "recreational purpose."51 The Rivera court
also wrote that the legislature's intent "to limit the applicability
of the Recreation Act to outdoor recreation on largely unim-
proved land is evident... from the Act's stated purpose....
The Recreation Act's statement of purpose, however, mentions no
such limitations."
The state supreme court revisited the Recreation Act in Walsh
v. City of Philadelphia.54 Although this time the plaintiffs inju-
ries occurred at an outdoor recreational facility, the Walsh court
held that Recreation Act immunity was not available to the
defendant, City of Philadelphia, because the site was "a com-
pletely improved recreational facility."55  The Walsh court
reasoned that: "By assuming responsibility of installing the
improvements that exist at this facility, the City concomitantly
assumed the responsibility for maintaining those improve-
ments."56
Subsequent court rulings, most importantly Mills v. Common-
wealth, 7 have continued to limit the types of recreational land
eligible for immunity under the Recreation Act.58 The plaintiffs
in Mills fell and sustained injury at Penn's Landing, a water-
front area in Philadelphia containing a marina, grassy areas and
a museum.5 9 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that even
if the plaintiffs were injured on the "unimproved" grassy areas,
Recreation Act immunity could not be invoked to cover recreation
50. Id. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §§ 477-2(3), 477-1 (West 1994).
51. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 477-2 (West 1994).
52. Rivera, 507 A.2d at 8.
53. PA STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 477-1 (West 1994). To bolster its conclusion that the
Recreation Act is available only to private landowners, the Rivera court references the
Model Act's commentary. Rivera, 507 A.2d at 7. The Recreation Act was passed by the
Pennsylvania Legislature, however, without commentary. Id.
54. 585 A.2d 445 (Pa. 1991).
55. Walsh, 585 A.2d at 450.
56. Id. Justices Nix and McDermott, among the dissenters in Rivera, again filed
dissents in Walsh stating that they found no basis in the Recreation Act for excluding
improved land. Id. at 453 (Nix, C.J., & McDermott, J., dissenting).
57. 633 A.2d 1115 (Pa. 1993).
58. See also Brown v. Tunkhannock Twp., 665 A.2d 1318 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995)
alloc. den. 675 A.2d 1252 (Pa. 1995)(finding baseball field at which bleachers had been
provided "improved land" outside purview of Recreation Act); Seifert v. Downingtown
Area Sch. Dist., 604 A.2d 757 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992) (holding lacrosse field is "improved
land" not eligible for Recreation Act immunity). But see Wilkinson v. Conoy Twp., 677 A.
2d 876 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996) (holding municipal park containing softball field "land"
under Recreation Act).
59. Mills, 633 A.2d at 1116.
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areas that were highly developed when viewed as a whole.60 The
court opined: "W]e believe the intended beneficiaries of the
[Recreation Act], in addition to the general public, are landown-
ers of large unimproved tracts of land which, without alteration,
is [sic] amenable to the enumerated recreational purposes within
the act."6 '
The Mills decision left open the question of what type of
improvements and how many improvements will cause a facility
to be viewed as highly developed.2 Additionally, by stating that
the intended beneficiaries of the Recreation Act are owners of
"large" tracts of land, the court raised the question of how big a
parcel must be to fall within the parameters of the Recreation
Act.63
III. THE GovERNMENTAL TORT IMMUNITY STATUTES
In addition to Recreation Act immunity, government agencies
may defend suits brought against them by individuals suffering
injuries on their land under both the Tort Claims and Sovereign
Immunity ActsA4
A. Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act
Pennsylvania's local government immunity statute, the Tort
Claims Act, grants local agencies blanket immunity from suit
except where: (1) the plaintiff's cause of action would otherwise
exist at common law or by statute if governmental immunity was
not available; (2) the conduct at issue was that of an officer,
60. Id. at 1118-19.
61. Id.
62. Id. For instance, inPomeren v. Commonwealth, 550 A.2d 852 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1988), the commonwealth court held that an earthen hiking trail in a state park was not
an improvement vitiating Recreation Act immunity. Id. at 854. After Mills, however, it
is arguable that a man-made trail, whether paved or not, constitutes an "alteration" that
makes the land ineligible for recreational immunity. Compare Brezinski v. County of
Allegheny, No. 2442 Civ. 1996 (Pa. Commw. Ct. May 27, 1997) (finding landscaped park
containing a picnic shelter "unimproved" land for Recreation Act purposes).
63. See Renwood, supra note 34, at 276-82 (advocating that population density,
size of land and degree of improvement be the factors used to decide if property is "land"
under the Recreation Act).
64. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8541-8564 (1995); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8521-
8528 (1995). See generally 18 McQuillin on Municipal Corporations § 53.24 (1992-93),
which provides:
The reason [for tort immunity of governmental entities] is one of public policy, to
protect public funds and public property. Taxes are raised for certain specific gov-
ernmental purposes; and, if they could be diverted to the payment of the damage
claims, the more important work of government, which every municipality must
perform regardless of its other relations, would be seriously impaired if not totally
destroyed.
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employee or agent of the municipality acting within the scope of
his or her employment; and (3) the plaintiffs injury resulted from
a negligent act falling into one of eight specified categories.65
Section 8542(a) of the Tort Claims Act specifically provides that
"'negligent acts' shall not include acts or conduct which consti-
tutes a crime, actual fraud, actual malice or willful miscon-
duct."66 Under the Tort Claims Act, therefore, where a plaintiff
avers willful misconduct on the part of a municipality, the stat-
ute bars recovery because liability may only be imposed for the
municipality's negligent acts.67
B. Sovereign Immunity Act
Similar in structure to the Tort Claims Act, the Sovereign
Immunity Act provides that a plaintiff seeking to impose liability
on a Commonwealth agency must establish that: (1) common law
or statutory causes of action would otherwise exist; (2) the injury
results from a Commonwealth agency's negligent act; and (3) the
negligent act falls within one of the statutory exceptions to
immunity.68
65. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8541-8564 (1995); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8521-
8528 (1995).
66. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8542(aX2) (1995) (emphasis added). See also Delate
v. Kolle, 667 A.2d 1218 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995), alloc. den., 678 A.2d 367 (Pa. 1995) (not-
ing that for purposes of statutory exception to defense of governmental immunity, "willful
misconduct" has the same meaning as term "intentional tort").
67. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8542(aX2) (1995); Petula v. Mellody, 631 A.2d 762 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1993)(finding that the Tort Claims Act bars recovery from local agency
where a plaintiff avers willful misconduct); Marko by Marko v. City of Philadelphia, 576
A.2d 1193 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990) (holding City immune from liability to a minor injured
in a fall from exercise bars on municipal playground, even if injury resulted from willful
or malicious conduct of municipal employees), appeal granted, 592 A.2d 46 (Pa. 1990).
Municipal employees, on the other hand, may be held individually liable for inju-
ries resulting from their willful misconduct. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8545-8550
(1995). See King v. Breach, 540 A.2d 976 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988) (noting that section
8550 of the Tort Claims Act abolishes immunity for willful misconduct on part of munici-
pal employees, but does not abrogate local agency immunity). Governmental immunity is
different than official immunity, which protects municipal employees and officers from
personal liability if they were acting within the scope of their employment when the
injury occurred. See generally Michael R. Bucci, Jr., Note, Judicial Clarification of a
Common-Law Doctrine: The Pennsylvania Doctrine of Official Immunity, 84 DICK. L.
REv. 473 (1979-80).
68. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8521, 8522 (1995). The nine categories of liability
are: (1) vehicle liability; (2) medical-professional liability; (3) care, custody or control of
personal property; (4) Commonwealth real estate, highways and sidewalks; (5) potholes
and other dangerous conditions; (6) care, custody or control of animals; (7) liquor store
sales; (8) National Guard activities; and (9) texoids and vaccines. Id. See, e.g., Moser v.
Heistand, 649 A.2d 177 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994) (holding that plaintiff seeking to overcome
defense of sovereign immunity must show: (1) a cause of action; that (2) falls within one of
the statutory exceptions to immunity).
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Unlike the Tort Claims Act, the Sovereign Immunity Act does
not expressly state that "negligent acts" do not include acts of
willful misconduct. 69 Case law interpreting the Sovereign Immu-
nity Act, however, distinguishes between acts of negligence and
acts of malice or willful misconduct.70 Thus, where a plaintiff
avers willful misconduct on the part of a state agency, the statute
effectively bars recovery because liability may only be imposed
for the Commonwealth's negligent acts.7'
IV. THE LORY DECISION
The interlocking immunities available to public agencies
under the Tort Claims Act, Sovereign Immunity Act and Recrea-
tion Act 72 were examined by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Lory v. City of Philadelphia.7 In that decision, the court granted
the City of Philadelphia absolute immunity under the Recreation
Act and Tort Claims Act from a lawsuit brought by the family of
a boy who drowned while swimming in a City owned pond.74
A. Lory v. City of Philadelphia: The Trial and
Commonwealth Court Decisions
In 1983, teenager David Barr drowned after he consumed alco-
hol and went swimming in Devil's Pool, a pond located in Phila-
delphia's Fairmount Park.75 Although the City had repeatedly
posted "no swimming" signs at the pond, the signs were promptly
removed by vandals.76 On the day Barr drowned, the signs were
missing.77 The family's lawsuit against the City alleged that it
failed to take adequate measures to guard or warn against swim-
69. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8522(a) (1995).
70. See Evans v. Philadelphia Transportation Co., 212 A.2d 440, 442-46 (Pa. 1965);
Geelen v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 161 A.2d 595, 599-600 (Pa. 1960).
71. See Frazier v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 868 F. Supp. 757 (E.D. Pa.
1994) (holding Commonwealth cannot be liable for damages arising out of intentional
torts). State officials and employees, however, remain personally liable for willful miscon-
duct committed outside the scope of their duties. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8524-8525
(1995); La Frankie v. Miklich, 618 A.2d 1145 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992) (finding Common-
wealth employee not protected by sovereign immunity from liability for intentional tort
claims where employee was acting outside scope of her employment).
72. This issue of interlocking immunities appears to be a case of first impression,
although the issue could have been explored in earlier cases. See Angeli v. Gov't of Mid-
dletown Twp., 8 D.&C. 4th 533 (C.P. Bucks Cty. 1990) (finding township not shielded
from liability under Recreation Act because its failure to fix hole in park could be viewed
as "willful;" Tort Claims Act interface not addressed).
73. 674 A.2d 673, 676 (Pa. 1996).
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ming in the pond.78 At trial, a jury found the City liable for negli-
gence and awarded plaintiffs decedent over $660,000 in
damages.79
The City filed post-verdict motions for judgment n.o.v. and a
new trial, arguing that: (1) it was immune from plaintiffs negli-
gence claim under section 6 of the Recreation Act because the Act
imposes liability on the City only for its "willful or malicious fail-
ure to guard or warn;" and (2) the City could not be held liable
for its willful or malicious failure to guard or warn because that
was synonymous with the "willful misconduct" for which the City
was immune pursuant to the Tort Claims Act.80
The Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas denied the City's
post-verdict motions and the City appealed to the Pennsylvania
Commonwealth Court."' On appeal, the commonwealth court
majority agreed with the trial court that the City's actions consti-
tuted a "willful or malicious failure to guard or warn" and there-
fore it was not immune from liability under the Recreation Act. 2
The appellate court further wrote that the City could not claim
immunity under the Tort Claims Act because "willful miscon-
duct" under the Tort Claims Act and "willful failure to guard or
warn" under the Recreation Act constitute two different states of
mind:
78. Id.
79. Barr v. City of Philadelphia, No. 2001, slip op. at 1-2 (decided June 8, 1993,
Phila. Cty. Ct. of Common Pleas, June Term), rev'd sub nom. Barr v. City of Philadelphia,
653 A.2d 1374 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995), rev'd sub norm. Lory v. City of Philadelphia, 674
A.2d 673 (Pa. 1996). The jury's verdict assessed comparative negligence of 55% against
the City and 45% against the plaintiff. Id. The jury award of $100,000 in the wrongful
death action, and $600,000 in the survival action was molded by the trial court to reflect
this comparative negligence and to add delay damages, resulting in a total verdict of
$660,915.79. Id.
80. Defendant City of Philadelphia's Brief in Support of its Motion for Post-Trial
Relief, Barr. v. City of Philadelphia, Phila. Cty. Ct. of Common Pleas, June Term, No.
2001, at 1-9.
81. Barr v. City of Philadelphia, No. 20091, slip. op. at 8. The commonwealth court
noted that its scope of review was limited to determining whether the trial court abused
its discretion or committed an error of law. Barr v. City of Philadelphia, 653 k2d 1374,
1378 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995) rev'd sub nom. Lory v. City of Philadelphia, 674 A.2d 673,
674 (Pa. 1996).
82. Barr, 653 A.2d at 1380. The commonwealth court determined that Devil's Pool
was located in a "remote and undeveloped portion" of Fairmount Park and thus was
"land" within the scope of the Recreation Act. Id. at 1378-79. Devil's Pool, however, is
located in a densely populated area of Philadelphia and is within one quarter mile of
bridges, a concession stand and restaurant, paved bike paths and other park improve-
ments. Fairmount Park Master Plan (1986). Neither the commonwealth court nor the
supreme court discussed how these park improvements affected the status of Devil's Pool
as "land" under the Recreation Act. See section I(c) of this note for discussion of what
constitutes land eligible for recreational immunity.
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Willful denotes an act of commission, requiring proof "that the actor
[affirmatively] desired to bring about the result that followed, or at
least [knew that] it was substantially certain to follow." On the other
hand, a willful failure to guard or warn denotes an actor's failure to
act or an intentional omission rather than an actor's intentional
desire to harm, kill, or maim.8 3
Nevertheless, the court reversed and remanded the case for a
new trial on the basis that evidence of unrelated drownings in
other City ponds had been erroneously admitted into evidence."I
The dissenting commonwealth court judges reached the same
conclusion later reached by the state supreme court: willful mis-
conduct encompasses willful failure to guard or warn.8 5 The dis-
sent noted that the majority had to conclude that the City:
(1) [HIad knowledge of the dangerous condition of Devil's Pool; (2)
should have realized that such condition involved an unreasonable
risk of harm to the public; and (3) failed to exercise reasonable care to
make the condition safe, or to warn the public. These elements are
consistent with those in the majority's definition of willful miscon-
duct, that being, "that the actor [affirmatively] desired to bring about
the result that followed, or at least [knew that] it was substantially
certain to follow."
8 6
The commonwealth court dissent disagreed with the majority's
conclusion that because the City did not possess the "desire to
harm, kill, or maim," there was no willful misconduct:
[A] desire to harm is not necessarily required for conduct to rise to the
level of willful misconduct. The definition of willful misconduct upon
which the majority relies states that as long as the actor knows that
harm will most likely follow, the conduct is willful misconduct. In the
present case, the evidence supports a conclusion that the City knew of
the dangerous conditions of Devil's Pool, and knew that someone
would most likely be injured as a result of their failure to guard or
warn.
8 7
Finally, the commonwealth court dissent noted that under sec-
tion 8542(a) of the Tort Claims Act, the City's willful or malicious
failure to guard or warn necessarily constituted either "negligent
acts" or "willful misconduct."88 The dissent stated that the City's
83. Barr, 653 A.2d at 1381. The commonwealth court implicitly concluded that
governmental immunity from willful misconduct under the Tort Claims Act does not
include immunity from claims of willful failure to guard or warn. Id.
84. Id. at 1383.
85. Id. at 1383 (McGinley, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 1384 (McGinley, J., dissenting). The dissent was applying the three part
test outlined in section 342 of Thf RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs for the duty owed to
gratuitous licensees. See supra text accompanying note 25 for text of this Restatement
section.
87. Barr, 653 A.2d at 1382.
88. Id. at 1384 (McGinley, J., dissenting)(citing 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 8542(a)
(1995)).
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actions had to be considered willful misconduct, and thus
immune under the Tort Claims Act, because the phrase "negli-
gent acts" in the Tort Claims Act had been held not to include
willful or malicious failures to act. 9
B. The State Supreme Court Decision
The City appealed the adverse commonwealth court ruling to
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, claiming that it should prevail
without a new trial on the ground that it was completely immune
from liability under the joint provisions of the Recreation Act and
Tort Claims Act.90 On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
read these two Acts together and, in a brief analysis, concluded
that the City's willful or malicious failure to maintain warning
signs could not be deemed a "negligent act" by the plain language
of the Tort Claims Act and parallel case law.91 The Lory court
implicitly held, then, that willful misconduct under the Tort
Claims Act includes willful failure to guard or warn.9 2 The Rec-
reation Act's exception to immunity for certain willful acts is
therefore negated by the Tort Claims Act's shield of immunity for
those very acts.
Chief Justice Nix and Justice Cappy concurred in the majority
Lory opinion, finding the result required by the language of the
two Acts at issue.93 Chief Justice Nix, however, objected to reaf-
firming restrictions on the types of land eligible for immunity
under the Recreation Act.94 Justice Nix's reading of Lory would
be even broader, extending the decision's blanket immunity to
many more types of recreational land including improved
lands.95 In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Cappy rues the
Lory decision as overly broad.96 Justice Cappy notes disapprov-
ingly that as a result of the Lory decision, political subdivisions
89. Id. at 1384-85 (McGinley, J., dissenting) (citing Jones v. Cheltenham Twp., 543
A.2d 1258 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988) (noting "willful" means an act done voluntarily or
intentionally or knowingly, as distinguished from accidentally); Zlakowski v. Common-
wealth, 624 A.2d 259 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993) (finding that complaint alleging negligence
in failing to warn recreational users could not be amended to allege willful or malicious
failure to warn because this would allege new cause of action after expiration of statute of
limitations)). This analysis of the Tort Claims Act's phrase "negligent acts" was the basis
upon which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court based its decision in favor of the City. Lory,
674 A.2d at 676.
90. Lory, 674 A.2d at 674.
91. Id. at 676.
92. See id. at 676 n.3 (Cappy, J., concurring).
93. Id. at 676 (Nix, C.J., & Cappy, J., concurring).
94. Id. (Nix, C. J., concurring).
95. Lory, 674 A.2d at 676 (Nix, C.J., concurring).
96. Id. (Cappy, J., concurring).
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and the Commonwealth 97 enjoy greater immunity than that of a
private citizen, and, "in fact will enjoy absolute immunity from
suit with respect to lands subject to the Recreation Act."9"
V. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES
At the time this note was drafted, the state legislature was
considering amending the Recreation Act. The competing legis-
lative proposals are: (1) to broaden the types of land covered by
Recreation Act immunity; or (2) to totally exclude governmental
entities from Recreation Act coverage. 99 Of course, if neither pro-
posal passes, the Recreation Act remains unchanged. In conjunc-
tion with the holding in Lory, legislative action - or inaction -
could result in one of three liability scenarios for governmental
entities, each with different policy implications.
A. Option I: Immunize All Government Owned Recreation
Facilities
The Lory holding provides governments with blanket immu-
nity for injuries occurring on their recreational lands. 00 As
detailed earlier in this note, recent court rulings limit Recreation
97. Justice Cappy notes that although the Lory case deals with the Tort Claims
Act, for purposes of applying Lory, the difference between the Tort Claims Act and the
Sovereign Immunity Act is "inconsequential." Lory, 674 A.2d at 677 n.4. Judge Cappy
therefore assumes that the immunity Lory grants to political subdivisions extends to
state agencies as well. Cf. Farley v. Township of Upper Darby, 514 A.2d 1023 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1986)(holding Pennsylvania Supreme Court's reasoning in Auresto regard-
ing Commonwealth's immunity under Recreation Act and Sovereign Immunity Act
equally applicable to municipalities under Tort Claims Act); Walsh v. City of Philadel-
phia, 585 A-2d 445 (Pa. 1991Xholding Tort Claims Act imposes liability upon municipali-
ties in same circumstances as Sovereign Immunity Act imposes liability upon
Commonwealth); DeLuca v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 654 A.2d 29 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1994) (concluding sovereign and governmental immunity exceptions are interpreted con-
jointly and consistently when there is similarity of subject matter).
98. Lory, 674 A.2d at 677 (Cappy, J., concurring). However, although the public
agency itself is absolutely immune from liability, a plaintiff remains able to recover from
government employees in certain circumstances. See supra text accompanying notes 68
& 72 for discussion of governmental and sovereign immunity from claims based in willful
misconduct. Note that the Lory reasoning granting governments blanket immunity could
also be construed by analogy to cover government land under the scope of the Penn-
sylvania Rails to Trails Act, 32 PA. PuRDONS STAT. § 5611 (1967 & Supp. 1997). Similar
to the Recreation Act, the Rails to Trails Act limits the liability of trail owners to recrea-
tional users. Id.
99. See S. 654, P.N. 1816, 1995 Pa. Sess.
100. Lory, 674 A.2d at 676. This "blanket immunity" outcome could also occur in
jurisdictions that require plaintiffs alleging "Willful failure to guard or warn" to prove
intentional conduct on the part of the defendant. In Kiepper v. City of Milford, 825 F.2d
1440 (10th Cir. 1987), for example, the court found that under Kansas law, "wilful failure
to warn is... a purposefully designed failure to warn with the intent to do wrong or cause
injury." Klepper, 825 F.2d. at 1447. The plaintiff in Klepper argued, and the court noted,
that this narrow definition of willfulness could "virtually abolish" rather than merely
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Act immunity to "land" that is large in size, located in a sparsely
populated area and unimproved. 10'
Park and recreation providers have become increasingly con-
cerned that these judicial decisions are contrary to the legisla-
tion's intent and that this narrow interpretation of the Act will
discourage projects to provide better access to outdoor recreation
facilities for persons with disabilities. 102 Consequently, Senate
Bill 219,13 reintroduced in the next legislative session as Senate
Bill 219, was introduced to amend the Recreation Act so that it
specifically provides for immunity to apply to both urban and
rural land and developed and undeveloped parcels of any size. 
0 4
Under the amended Recreation Act, all public and private recre-
ation land would receive immunity from suits based on negli-
gence. 10 5 In conjunction with the Tort Claims and Sovereign
Immunity Acts' immunity for willful misconduct, Senate Bill 219
limit the liability of government landowners to recreational users. Id. at 1445 & n.6.
Accord Bingaman v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 1 F.3d 976 (10th Cir. 1993).
101. See Mills v. Commonwealth, 633 A.2d 1115 (Pa. 1991); Walsh v. City of Phila-
delphia, 585 A.2d 445 (Pa. 1991); Rivera v. Philadelphia Theological Seminary, 507 A.2d
1 (Pa. 1986).
102. See Pennsylvania Fish and Boat Commission, Information Paper on Recreation
Use of Land and Water Act, 68 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 477-1 (1994). The Information Paper
notes that:
[T]he uncertain state of the law has discouraged landowners and clubs and organi-
zations from undertaking projects to provide better access for persons with disabili-
ties. Such projects may include installation of parking areas near fishing, boating
or hunting opportunities, construction of paths, trails or ramps suitable for wheel-
chair use.. . and installation of fishing piers and boat docks.
Id.
103. S. 654, P.N. 1816, 1995 Pa. Sess. At the time this note went to press, this Bill
had been reintroduced as Senate Bill 219. See S. 219, P.N. 211, 1997 Pa. Sess. Therefore,
throughout the rest of this article, original Bill 654 will be referred to as Senate Bill 219.
104. See Section 2 of Senate Bill 654, P.N. 686, originally introduced by Senator
Doyle Corman and others on March 2, 1995, which provides:
(1) "Land" means land, roads, water, watercourses, private ways and buildings,
structures [and], boating access and launch ramps, fishing piers, boat docks,
ramps, paths, trails, shooting ranges, hunting blinds and areas providing access to
or parking for lands and waters, including, but not limited to, access ramps, trails
or piers for use by persons with disabilities. The term also includes machinery or
equipment when attached to the realty. The term applies to such areas and physi-
cal objects, whether they are in an unimproved condition or a condition improved by
manmade effort, whether they are large or small in size and whether they are
located in a rural or an urban area.
S. 654, P.N. 686, § 2, 1995 Pa. Sess. Section 2 of Senate Bill 219 is the same as Senate
Bill 654 except that the new Bill adds "horseback riding," "field sports" and "basketball"
to the list of covered recreational purposes. S. 219, P.N. 211, 1997 Pa. Sess.
105. See S. 219, P.N. 211, § 2, 1997 Pa. Sess. The requirements of "recreational
purpose" and entry "without charge" would still have to be met. Id.
Pennsylvania would not be alone in extending immunity to all recreational sites.
See, e.g., hL. ANN. STAT. ch. 745 §§ 65/1 to 65/7 (1993Xproviding complete Recreation Act
immunity to all recreational sites). Illinois municipalities, however, remain liable for
willful and wanton actions. See James L. DeAno, Governmental Immunity for Recrea-
tional Injuries, ILL. BAR JoURNAL, Jan. 1994, Vol. 82, at 28-40.
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effectively would give governments absolute tort immunity from
injuries occurring at their recreation facilities. 10 6 The Bill would
thus greatly broaden the impact of the Lory holding. 107
There are public policy arguments both for and against this
outcome. As a result of its blanket limitation of liability, Senate
Bill 219 encourages governments to offer recreational facilities to
the greatest number of people possible in both urban and rural
settings. 08 It promotes the economic benefits that result from
recreation-based tourism. 0 9 The amendment's broad definition
106. But, as discussed above, this immunity does not extend to entities that charge
a fee for use of their recreation areas. See supra note 42. Even if the recreational use is
free, if it is offered as a benefit of a paid transaction, such as a campground fee, Recrea-
tion Act immunity may not exist. Cf French v. Woodloch Pines, 46 D. & C.3d __ (C.P.
Pike County 1986) (noting that toboggan run available to hotel users free of charge was
not necessarily immune from liability under Recreation Act).
Before extending Recreation Act immunity to a property, courts will also look to
see whether the plaintiff entered upon the property for a "recreational purpose." In Penn-
sylvania, this threshold may be met even in cases where the property owner did not
intend the land to be used recreationally. See Friedman v. Grand Central Sanitation,
Inc., 571 A.2d 373 (Pa. 1990) (holding owner of landfill entitled to Recreation Act protec-
tion where plaintiff hunter was using landfill for hunting and overcome by caustic fumes).
Other jurisdictions have required that this recreational purpose requirement be met from
a landowner's perspective as well. See Glen Rothstein, Note, Recreational Use Statutes
and Private Landowner Liability: A Critical Examination of Ornelas v. Randolph, 15
WHITTIER LAw REv. 1123 (1994) (analyzing California's "recreational purpose" require-
ment). See also Diamond v. Springfield Metropolitan Exposition Auditorium Auth., 44
F.3d 599 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding plaintiffs negligence claim barred under the state recre-
ation act since although plaintiffs visit to convention center where injury occurred was
not related to recreation, multi-purpose convention center was recreational "in
character").
107. Other amendments that would strengthen and expand the Recreation Act
include: 1) providing tax relief in exchange for allowing public use of private land; 2)
allowing user fees to be applied toward maintaining the recreational resource without
loss of immunity; 3) offering negligence immunity from suits brought by volunteers work-
ing on the land; 4) establishing a state indemnification system or awarding attorneys' fees
to recreation providers so that property owners know in advance they will not bear litiga-
tion costs; and 5) including lessees, conservation organizations and others who hold an
interest in the recreational land within the Recreation Act's definition of "owner." See
SCHWAJZ, supra note 15, at 285-86.
108. Unhampered by the fear of costly litigation, governments presumably would be
free to make recreation facilities available to a greater number of citizens. Cf Rivera v.
Philadelphia Theological Seminary, 507 A.2d 1, 18 (1986) (McDermott, J., dissenting)
(finding that in enacting the Recreation Act, "[tihe legislature balanced danger against a
benefit to a great number of people; allowing a use of facilities with immunity from liabil-
ity, great and small, so that many could have, what the possible consequences for an
injury to one, would make improvident to give to any").
109. Pennsylvania's parks, forests, greenways and other recreational areas are
essential elements of the state's $18 billion tourism industry, which is second only to the
state's agricultural industry. See Governor Tom Ridge, Governor's Office, Proclamation,
Recreation and Parks Month (July 1996). One study estimated that the economic impact
of state parks alone was $562 million. Impact of State Parks on Pennsylvania's Economy,
13 (July 1990). One could argue that the more recreational activities are important to a
region's or state's economy, the more recreational risks should be allocated to the partici-
pant rather than to the recreation provider. See generally Cathy Hansen & Steve Duerr,
800
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of "land" also could avoid time consuming and hair splitting liti-
gation over how large and undeveloped a property must be to
qualify for Recreation Act immunity.
On the other hand, the conjunction of the Lory holding and
Senate Bill 219 would leave injured plaintiffs with limited
recourse for compensation, 110 which runs counter to recent
trends in tort law."' This outcome might be perceived as unfair,
particularly where a plaintiff was injured at a highly developed
recreational facility." 2
B. Option II: Strip Governments of Recreation Act Immunity
When the original Senate Bill 654 was submitted for review to
the Pennsylvania House of Representatives, it underwent a dra-
matic revision: an amendment to exclude from the Act's cover-
age all "recreational property owned or operated by the
Commonwealth or local government agencies." 3 By stripping
government of the negligence immunity offered by the Recreation
Act, this version of the Bill overturns Commonwealth v.
Auresto 1 4 and effectively negates the Lory holding. The amend-
ment puts recreational land on the same footing as other munici-
pally or state owned property, subjecting agencies to liability
under the Tort Claims and Sovereign Immunity Acts for negli-
Note, Recreational Injuries & Inherent Risks: Wyoming's Recreation Safety Act, 28 UNiv.
OF Wyo. LAND & WATER L. REv. 149 (1993).
110. This result would occur unless the injury was intentionally caused by a govern-
ment employee. See supra notes 67 & 71.
111. See Specter v. Commonwealth, 341 A.2d 481, 483 (Pa. 1975) limited 354 A.2d
52 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1976), (illustrating that the trend in recent years has been "to do
away with immunities from suit which are neither constitutionally or statutorily com-
pelled"). But at least one other state provides for absolute sovereign and municipal
immunity in its recreational user statute. See OHIo REV. CODE Ann. §§ 1533.18, 1533.181
(1995Xproviding that landowners owe no duty to recreational users); Phillips v. Ohio
Dept. of Natural Resources, 498 N.E. 2d 230 (Ohio App. 1985) (noting that under the
recreational immunity statute, a state is not subject to liability even for its willful or
intentional misconduct).
112. See Renwood, supra note 34, at 279-81 (discussing protecting the reasonable
expectations of recreation users); Walsh, 585 A.2d at 450 (providing: "By assuming
responsibility of installing the improvements that exist at this facility, the City concomi-
tantly assumed the responsibility for maintaining those improvements.").
113. S. 654, P.N. 1816, § 2(1), 1995 Pa. Sess. (as amended on third consideration,
House of Representatives, March 12, 1996). The House version of the Bill added the fol-
lowing sentence to the definition of "land:" "The term does not include recreational prop-
erty or facilities owned or operated by the Commonwealth or local governmental agencies."
Id. This highly restrictive amendment was not proposed again when Senate Bill 654 was
reintroduced as Senate Bill 219. At the time of this note, however, Senate Bill 219 was
tabled until a compromise could be reached.-
114. 511 A.2d 815 (Pa. 1986)
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gent maintenance of their recreational properties.115 But, under
those Acts, governments would still be immune from suits
grounded in willful misconduct.
1 6
This approach to negligence immunity also has its pros and
cons. Unlike original Senate Bill 654, the House amendment
provides a person injured by a public agency's negligent mainte-
nance of its recreational lands with recourse to financial compen-
sation. 11 7 This threat of tort liability presumably would cause
governments to exercise additional caution in the repair and
upkeep of public recreation facilities.
These positive results must be balanced, however, against the
additional tort liability that local governments and state agen-
cies would certainly incur as a result of the House amendment." 8
The extra governmental liability undoubtedly would be at the
expense of the recreating public, reducing the money available
for providing parks and recreation areas and making govern-
ments more cautious in their delivery of services." 9  For
115. A claim based in negligence would still have to clear the hurdles presented by
the real estate exceptions to immunity in both tort immunity acts. See, e.g., Mascaro v.
Youth Study Center, 523 A.2d 1118, 1124 (Pa. 1987) (providing waiver of immunity for
injuries caused by real property in the care, custody or control of a local agency, set forth
in section 8542(b) of the Tort Claims Act, is applicable only where artificial condition or
defect of the land itself causes injury); Preteroti v. Uniservice, Inc., 413 A.2d 787 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1980) (setting forth that cause of action against Commonwealth under real
estate exception to immunity, section 8522(b) of the Sovereign Immunity Act, requires
allegation that special characteristics of lake made it dangerous).
116. See supra text accompanying notes 67 & 71. Note that even this restrictive
amendment does not completely cure the outcome that Supreme Court Justice Cappy
complained of in his concurrence in Lory. See supra text accompanying note 99.
117. S. 654, P.N. 1816, § 2(1), 1995 Pa. Sess. See Legislative Pennsylvania Refer-
ence Bureau (unofficial), Senate Bill 654, Feese Amendment Debate, at 27-30 (state rep-
resentative introducing House amendment stated that "Senate Bill 654, without this
amendment, would preclude an innocent injured taxpayer of the Commonwealth who is
injured by a dangerous condition created by the Commonwealth or local government from
having any possibility of seeking compensation.").
118. The position paper on Senate Bill 654 prepared by the Pennsylvania Depart-
ment of Conservation and Natural Resources ("DCNR") indicates that the House version
of the Bill is supported by the state trial lawyers' lobby. DCNR Position Paper on S. 654.
Given the fortuitous timing of the House amendment (March 12, 1996), it appears possi-
ble its sponsors anticipated and tried to counter the April 17, 1996 Lory decision.
119. In addition to the DCNR, other organizations strongly opposing the House
amendment include: the Game Commission, Fish and Boat Commission, Pennsylvania
Recreation and Park Society, Pennsylvania Land Trust Alliance and Pennsylvania Town-
ship Supervisors Association.
The following comment made by a Game Commission official about the proposed
House amendment to S. 654 is a good example of the types of concerns these agencies
have:
The immediate concern of the Game Commission is that with this loss of protection
we [put a] drain on our budget just because of litigation costs.... Under our addi-
tional properties [which a municipality opens to public hunting under a cooperative
agreement with the Commission] ... the fear is that if they got into a lot of litiga-
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instance, the position paper issued by the DCNR, the agency that
oversees Pennsylvania's state park and forest system, provides:
[The House amendment] would be devastating to public landowners
and be tremendously costly to Pennsylvania taxpayers. .. . Govern-
ment entities, especially small municipalities, do not have the finan-
cial resources to pay litigation costs and lawsuits. It is anticipated
that the loss of [the Recreation Act's] protection to public landowners
would have a chilling effect on government's interest and ability to
participate in the development of recreation facilities such as ball
fields, trails, boat accesses, and other park facilities. Local govern-
ments may choose to close existing facilities.
120
If restitution for injured plaintiffs was the reason underlying
the House amendment to the Recreation Act, perhaps a wiser
approach than stripping public entities of negligence immunity is
to amend the Tort Claims and Sovereign Immunity Acts to per-
mit liability to be imposed for a governmental agency's willful
misconduct in certain instances.
C. Option III: No Action Alternative
If neither Senate Bill 219 nor the previously proposed House
amendment to the Recreation Act is passed, the decisions from
Lory v. City of Philadelphia'21 and Mills v. Commonwealth122
combine to dictate that governments are immune from suits
based in negligence or willful misconduct as long as the recrea-
tional injury occurs on large, semi-rural and undeveloped parcels
of land. 123 Currently, this is the status of the law in
Pennsylvania.
124
tion involving something like this, the first thing they're going to do is deny public
access.
Joe Gorden, New Legislation Could Impact Public Access To Land, The Johnstown Trib-
une-Democrat, Sept. 18, 1996 at D7. Cf Hahn v. United States, 493 F. Supp. 57, 59 (M.D.
Pa.), affd without opinion, 639 F.2d 773 (3d Cir. 1980) (granting Recreation Act immu-
nity to federal government under Federal Tort Claims Act on ground that the United
States has no obligation to make its property available to the recreating public); Contra
Mayle, 388 A.2d at 714-15 (disputing suggestion that making governments liable for their
torts would substantially raise costs of government or upset governmental financial
stability).
120. DCNR Position Paper on S. 654.
121. 674 A.2d 673 (Pa. 1996).
122. 633 A.2d 1115 (Pa. 1991).
123. See section II(c) of this note for discussion of judicial restrictions on scope of the
Recreation Act.
124. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Conoy Twp., 677 A.2d 876 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996) (stat-
ing: '[WIhether it acts maliciously or negligently, the municipality or other governmental
unit is absolutely immune, without exception, for injuries occurring on municipally-
owned recreational land.').
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Such a "no action" outcome constitutes a framework that other
jurisdictions have arrived at legislatively.'25 The New Jersey
and California tort immunity acts, for example, completely
immunize public entities and employees from liability for inju-
ries caused by unimproved public property.1
26
Although the recreational immunity available to local and
state agencies appears broad under the Lory decision, it is not
absolute because of judicial erosion of the types of "land" encom-
passed by the Recreation Act. Under current law, a person
injured by poorly maintained improvements to a highly devel-
oped recreational facility can seek financial compensation.127 On
the other hand, recreational users injured by a natural condition
existing on undeveloped public property bear the risk of injury.'2s
Leaving the Act untouched does provide a middle ground.
129
Without legislative action, however, the current judicial trend
toward narrowing the Recreation Act's scope means that recrea-
tion providers will be hesitant to continue opening their lands to
recreational users and to make improvements needed for safety,
convenience and disabled accommodation purposes.
125. At least one author suggests that a legislative approach to this issue would be
more desirable. See Pamela Lajeunesse, Note, The Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act:
Pennsylvania's Response to the Problems of Municipal Tort Liability, 84 Dicy. L. REv.
717, 746 (1979-80) (calling legislature's failure to insert recreational immunity provision
into Pennsylvania's Tort Claims Act a "significant oversight").
126. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:4-8 (1992), and CAL. GOVT CODE §§ 831.2, 831.4,831.6
(West 1983), respectively. The New Jersey Tort Claims Act, for instance, provides public
entities and employees with absolute immunity for injuries caused by "natural condi-
tion(s) of any lake, stream, bay, river or beach." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:4-8 (1992). The
legislative comment to the section sets forth that it:
[Rieflect[s] the policy determination that it is desirable to permit the members of
the public to use public property in its natural condition and that the burdens and
expenses of putting such property in a safe condition as well as the expense of
defending claims for injuries would probably cause many public entities to close
such areas to public use. In view of the limited funds available for the acquisition
and improvement of property for recreational purposes, it is not unreasonable to
expect persons who voluntarily use unimproved public property to assume the risk
of injuries arising therefrom as part of the price to be paid for benefits received....
In addition it is intended under those sections that the term unimproved
public property should be liberally construed and determined by comparing the
nature and extent of the improvement with the nature and extent of the land. Cer-
tain improvements may be desirable and public entities should not be unreasona-
bly deterred from making them by the threat of tort liability.
Id. The California Tort Immunity Act provides absolute governmental immunity for
trails and unpaved roads leading to recreational areas and for unimproved public prop-
erty. CAL. GOVT CODE §§ 831.2, 831.4, 831.6 (West 1983).
127. See Walsh, 585 A.2d at 450-51.
128. See Lory, 674 A.2d at 674.
129. An alternative approach is to except out from Recreation Act immunity specifi-
cally listed, highly developed recreational facilities such as indoor gymnasiums and swim-
ming pools.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Commonwealth agencies and municipalities are now afforded
blanket immunity from claims brought by people injured on gov-
ernment owned recreational lands under Lory v. City of Philadel-
phia. The Lory decision held that Pennsylvania's Recreation Use
of Land and Water Act immunizes public agencies from negli-
gence claims, while the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act and
Sovereign Immunity Act immunize the agencies from claims of
willful misconduct. An injured plaintiffs only hope is to try to
abrogate that immunity by arguing that the land where the
injury occurred falls outside the definition of "land" in the Recre-
ation Act.
Whether the Lory holding will be extended to all public recrea-
tion facilities, or, conversely, whether governments will even be
able to claim immunity under the Recreation Act are matters
currently being considered by the state legislature. Each alter-
native answer to this issue differs in its financial and policy
implications for governments and injured plaintiffs. Removing
governments from eligibility for Recreation Act immunity bene-
fits injured plaintiffs, but will undoubtedly reduce the public pro-
vision of park and recreation facilities. If the law is left
untouched, because of the current judicial trend toward narrow-
ing the scope of Recreation Act immunity, public and private
landowners alike will be more cautious in opening their land to
recreational users and in making improvements needed for con-
venience and disabled accommodation purposes. Legislators
should consider that passage of Senate Bill 219, which provides
Recreation Act immunity to both urban and rural land and devel-
oped and undeveloped recreational parcels of any size, is the
approach that will encourage the provision of recreational facili-
ties to the greatest number of people in the Commonwealth. To
address concerns about restitution for injured plaintiffs, the leg-
islature could consider amending the Tort Claims and Sovereign
Immunity Acts to provide a basis for liability for governmental
acts of willful misconduct.
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